Research Article | ![]()
RIS-CFH: Physical Layer Authentication via Channel Fingerprint Hopping Using a Secret Pseudo-Random Phase Sequence Against an Adaptive Adversary
Author(s): Mohammed Aboud Kadhim1*, Murooj Nadhom2, and Ameer Abdul Sattar Jaber3
Published In : International Journal of Electrical and Electronics Research (IJEER) Volume 14, Issue 3
Publisher : FOREX Publication
Published : 30 September 2026
e-ISSN : 2347-470X
Page(s) :882-894
Abstract
Physical layer authentication (PLA) verifies a transmitter from the characteristics of its wireless channel without per-packet cryptographic signaling. Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) enrich such channel fingerprints, but a fixed RIS configuration can be learned and replayed by an adversary that accumulates pilot observations. This paper proposes RIS channel fingerprint hopping (RIS-CFH), in which the RIS configuration applied to each of S pilot symbols in every slot is generated by a cryptographically secure pseudo-random generator (CSPRNG) whose seed is shared only by Alice, Bob and the RIS controller. Bob does not compare the current observation with that of the previous slot; instead, he predicts the legitimate fingerprint of the current secret configuration from an enrolled and continuously tracked estimate of the direct and cascaded channels. The null distribution of the resulting statistic is shown to be Gamma(S,1), which yields an exact Neyman–Pearson threshold, while estimation error and channel ageing are absorbed by online calibration. Against the strongest non-predicting adversary, which is granted genie knowledge of the channel at Bob and an unlimited observation record, the per-slot spoofing probability is bounded by a regularized incomplete gamma function whose argument decreases in proportion to the number of RIS elements N at fixed transmit power. By contrast, a finite codebook of M states have an irreducible (1-α)/M spoofing floor, and PRBS31-indexed hopping is broken by Berlekamp–Massey synthesis after about 16 slots. Monte Carlo simulations at 28 GHz with path loss, spatial correlation, 1-bit phase quantization, channel-estimation error and Doppler (N=256, S=4, direct-link SNR of 25 dB) give an empirical false-alarm rate of 4.7% (quasi-static channel) to 5.6% (with Doppler, f_D T_s=10^(-3)) for a 5% target, an AUC of 0.9988 ± 0.0003, and a per-slot spoofing probability of 0.50% (95% confidence interval 0.41–0.61%) that does not increase with the adversary’s observation length, provided the channel coherence time exceeds approximately (N+1)/S slots.
Keywords: Physical Layer Authentication, Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface, Channel Fingerprint Hopping, Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Generator, Spoofing Detection, Hypothesis Testing, 6G Security, Adaptive Adversary.
Mohammed Aboud Kadhim, Polytechnic College for Engineering Middle Technical University (MTU) Baghdad, Iraq
Murooj Nadhom, College of Electromechanical Engineering, University of Technology, Baghdad, Iraq
Ameer Abdul Sattar Jaber, Polytechnic College for Engineering Middle Technical University (MTU) Baghdad, Iraq
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